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MORTGAGES-CONTRIBUTION-RIGHT OF SURVIVING TENANT BY THE EN-
TIRETY TO CONTRIBUTION FOR JOINT MORTGAGE DEBT-Decedent and his wife 
held title to certain land as tenants by the entirety. Shortly before decedent's 
death they jointly incurred an indebtedness of $8000 secured by a mortgage 
on such land. The proceeds of the loan were used to improve the mortgaged 
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property. After decedent's death his widow, having succeeded to full owner-
ship of the mortgaged land, claimed that she was entitled to contribution 
from decedent's estate for one-half of the joint mortgage debt upon the 
property. On the executors' petition for a final distribution decree the 
lower court denied the widow's right to contribution from the estate. On 
appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Decedent's estate must con-
tribute one-half of the mortgage debt. The right of contribution is an at-
tribute of joint liability flowing directly from the debt itself, and it does 
not depend upon a common interest in the land mortgaged to secure 
such debt. In re Keil's Estate, (Del. 1958) 145 A (2d) 563. 
There is a sharp conflict of authority as to whether a surviving spouse 
who discharges a joint mortgage debt on property held by the entirety 
has a right of contribution against the deceased spouse's estate. The prob-
lem usually arises when the proceeds of the mortgage loan are used for the 
benefit of the jointly held property.1 One view, allowing contribution, 
proceeds on the theory that decedent's estate has been benefited by the 
payment of the joint obligation because it satisfied a claim against the 
estate.2 Liability to contribute is consequently based on the rule that when 
a joint obligation is discharged by only one obligor, he should receive from 
the other obligors what he has paid on their behalf.a Emphasis is placed 
on the joint debt as the source of the common burden giving rise to con-
tribution.4 The other view proceeds on the theory that the mortgage lien 
is the source of a common burden upon the co-obligors, and because the 
lien, no longer affects decedent's estate when the entire title to the land 
passes to the surviving spouse, contribution is denied.5 The land is said 
to oe the primary fund for the payment of the debt and therefore carries 
the entire burden of payment to the surviving spouse.a Comparison of the 
two views indicates that the point upon which the courts are divided is 
the question whether the payment of the joint debt benefited the non-paying 
obligor in such a manner as to require contribution. Contribution rests 
1 In the usual case the land held by the entirety is encumbered with a "purchase 
money" mortgage. See the cases cited in notes 2 and 5 infra. However, where the pro-
ceeds of the mortgage loan are used to improve the property, as in the principal case, sub-
stantially the same problem is presented. In both situations the entire benefit of the loan 
inures to the surviving spouse. 
2 In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A. (2d) 209 (1951); Underwood v. Ward, 239 
N.C. 513, 80 S.E. (2d) 267 (1954); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444 
(1929). See comment, 32 BoST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 253 (1952). See also Magenheimer v. 
Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919), holding that where the estate paid a 
joint debt secured by a mortgage on property held by the entirety the estate was entitled 
to contribution from the widow. 
3Eliason v. Eliason, 3 Del. Ch. 260 at 263 (1869); Brown v. Brown, 58 Ariz. 333, 119 P. 
(2d) 938 (1941 ). 
4 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, note 2 supra, at 447. 
5 Lopez v. Lopez, (Fla. 1956) 90 S. (2d) 456; Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 
870 (1927); Geldhart v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 209 App. Div. 581, 205 N.Y.S. 238 
(1924). See also note, 13 UNIV. PIIT. L. R.Ev. 763 (1951). 
6 See Lopez v. Lopez, note 5 supra, at 459. 
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upon the equitable principle that one shall not be made to bear more 
than his just share of a common burden to the advantage of his co-
obligors;7 it therefore appears to be essentially a payment for the bene-
fit conferred on the non-paying obligor. In the typical joint debt situation 
the advantage which the courts find conferred on the non-paying co-
obligor appears in one of two forms. It can be found in either the pro-
ceeds of the debt which each co-obligor presumably receives,8 or in the 
discharge of an obligation for which each co-obligor is primarily liable.9 
In most cases the non-paying obligor is substantially benefited in both 
ways.1° In the principal case, however, it would seem that neither of these 
benefits is sufficiently present to afford an equitable basis for contribu-
tion. The widow alone obtained all the benefits of the proceeds of the 
joint debt by succeeding to ownership of the improved land.11 While the 
decedent was benefited by the use of the improvements acquired with the 
proceeds of the joint debt during his lifetime, the right to contribution 
could not arise before satisfaction of the joint obligation,12 when the en-
tire benefits of the debt proceeds had passed to the paying obligor. The 
majority of the court in the principal case, however, found a benefit in 
the fact the estate was discharged from primary liability on the joint debt.18 
But while the removal of a legally enforceable claim against the estate is 
clearly of some benefit to it, such a benefit does not seem sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant the application of equitable contribution doctrines. 
Since the value of the mortgaged land in the principal case was admittedly 
more than enough to satisfy the debt there is little likelihood any claim 
would ever be asserted against the estate. The benefit to the estate there-
fore is in large part illusory. On the other hand, in the event of default the 
widow is likely to lose the land of which she is now sole owner. It would 
seem then that the discharge of the debt is of far greater importance to 
the widow than it is to her husband's estate. The likelihood that the 
7 See McKelroy v. Hamilton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 130 S.W. (2d) lll4; Asylum of St. 
Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N.Y. 375, 146 N.E. 632 (1925). Contribution is an 
equitable doctrine and must be applied according to the equities of the parties involved. 
Hoverson v. Hoverson, 216 Minn. 228 at 235, 12 N.W. (2d) 501 (1943); Carey v. McCaslin, 
(Ohio App. 1942) 43 N.E. (2d) 519; Lorimer v. Julius Knack Coal Co., 246 Mich. 214 at 
217, 224 N.W. 362 (1929); 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., 157 (1941). 
s In re McGlinn's Estate, 55 Montg. (Pa.) 5 at 10 (1939); Maresh v. Jennings, (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1931) 38 S.W. (2d) 406. 
9 See Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E. (2d) 788 (1957). Cf. Kennedy v. Camp, 
14 N.J. 390, 102 A. (2d) 595 (1954). 
10 Waters v. Waters, IIO Conn. 342 at 345, 148 A. 326 (1929). 
11 See Rell v. Combes, 25 Ohio App. 476, 159 N.E. 133 (1927), finding that the duty 
to contribute ceases when all the proceeds of the joint debt have passed to the paying 
obligor. Similarly, it has been held that the measure of liability to contribute is deter-
mined by the proportionate interest of each obligor in the proceeds of the joint debt. See 
Maresh v. Jennings, note 8 supra. 
12 Gafford v. Tittle, 224 Ala. 605 at 608, 141 S. 653 (1932); Dennig v. Meckfessel, 303 
Mo. 525 at 530, 261 S.W. 55 (1924). 
13 Principal case at 565. 
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mortgage would be foreclosed in the event of default means the widow has 
received not only the proceeds of the debt but the practical burden of its 
payment as well. To base the right to contribution in such circumstances 
solely on the fact of discharge of legal liability is to make the doctrine of 
contribution one of form rather than substance.14 
Stevan Uzelac, S.Ed. 
14 See Rell v. Combes, note 11 supra, where the court refused to make legal liability 
alone the test for determining the question of contribution. 
